Partnership for Peace: Framework Document

    Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

    This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.

    In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

    They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commit- ments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.


    The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

        facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;

        ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

        maintenance of the capability and readiness to con- tribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

        the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

        the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

    The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

    In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

    The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

        those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;

        they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;

        they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;

        those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;

        building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;

        they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

    In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

        develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

        promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

    NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

Regretfully should be stated, that in the certain political circles of Russia the forcing of inten-
sity around of events in Abkhazia and Georgia as a whole does not end.

The statement of the representative of the MFA of the Russian Federation from March, 21,
2002 is an evident confirmation of the fact.

Uncompromisingly adhering to a principle of peaceful settlement of Abkhazian conflict, con-
sidering political methods of its resolving as nonalternative, the government of Georgia, cer-
tainly, is concerned by the occuring in the zone of conflict with acts of violence, absence of
the elementary law, order and conditions of safety, first of all for the refugees, who have come
back to their native places are suffering of it.

The Georgian side repeatedly stated and states a issue on acceptance of drastic steps, includ-
ing change of mandate for Collective Peace Keeping Forces (CPKF), and also some other
actions to achieve the consent to which realization, till now it is not possible.

Proceeding from this, the Georgian Side can not consider reasonable the accusations put for-
ward to its address. In opinion of the Georgian Side, categorical unilateral estimations con-
taining in the application on the facts which investigation is not conducted yet especially are
groundless, that only emphasizes tendentiousness of its authors.

It should be known to the authors of the statement, that an original cause of preservation and
escalation of intensity in the zone of conflict, is absence of any progress of political settlement
during long period of time as which basis the appropriate offers on differentiation of the con-
stitutional authorities between Tbilisi and Sukhumi should serve. For nobody is a secret by
whom and by what means are blocked the achievements of the arrangements under these of-

In connection with the aforesaid, the accusation of official Tbilisi in equivocacy of its position
and doubt in sincerity of its intents is, at least, incorrect.

Concerning the information of allegedly groundless assertions of presence of international
terrorists, Tbilisi Authorities consider that Moscow should have listened to this reports and do
not reject them, from the very beginning, as the appearing of possible refuge of international
terrorists, practically in uncontrolling zone can cause serious problems first of all to Russia.
In this connection, it is regretful, that the certain representatives of political circles of Russia
are concerned more of activization of the American - Georgian military cooperation, than
availability of the centers of tension in the region.

Because of it, the statement of the representative of the MFA of Russia cannot be perceived
but as containing ungrounded, irresponsible accusations which can cause only serious damage
to the Russian - Georgian dialogue and prevent peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Tbilisi, March, 22, 2002.