Vladimer Narsia - Canon Lawyer, Cardiff University, UK. Chairman of Religious Dialogue for Peace in Georgia.
This policy brief analyzes the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) in Georgian society, particularly in the context of promoting the European integration process. The paper consists of three sections: sermons and preaching that influence European integration policy; the Church-State nexus as a non-secular alliance; and the weak international links of the GOC. All three sections look at the GOC from the perspective of its level of support for Georgia’s European integration policy. While Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II can be considered an ecumenical and equivalently a European minded leader based on some of his statements, his position has not been shared by all Georgian primates 1 and, in this paper, this ambiguity is considered a threat for the state’s European policy. Overall, the paper assumes that the GOC is in the primary stage of developing a clearer and more lucid positive role, which would allow it to avoid polarizing the society over the critical question of the European policy.
Georgia’s European integration policy is more than a political agenda; it also impacts social and cultural issues in the country, areas that traditionally fall under the influence of the GOC. The position of the Church is widely acknowledged and accepted in public debates in Georgian society, which makes it an important factor in the European integration process, as voters 2 may be influenced by anti-Western primates’ moods and their sermons against Europe.
This policy brief examines the GOC as a civil institution, which can serve the purpose of social consolidation or integration. That means that the Georgian government’s policy toward the Church, as well as the role of the Church as a supporting institution in the country’s European integration policy, are viewed as decisive in order to achieve the level of social harmony required to achieve the government’s aspiration to join the European family. Any delayed response to these sensitive issues could lead to the grievous result of splitting and polarizing society.
Sermons and Preaching
In Georgian society clerics carry considerable weight. Their commands are respected by
thousands of believers and quite often are taken as “priestly” advice without question. This tendency has been warmly welcomed by government officials. In this context, it is necessary to pay special attention to the sermons 3 that cultivating fears in Georgian society and present Europe as a threat for Georgian spiritual traditions. 4 The Holy Synod does not refute these sermons or clerics, which gives critics a basis to claim that GOC officially supports this position. Patriarch Ilia II follows the ongoing discussion 5 concerning the European integration process and, at times, speaks in favor of Georgia’s alignment with the EU. But not all of his statements support the integration process. In 2014 he strongly opposed the anti-discrimination law, which was viewed as a necessary step to secure the Association Agreement between EU and Georgia. 6 Primates are also concerned about the growing tendency of Georgians receiving their higher education in Europe. It was rather confusing when the Patriarch Ilia II expressed worries for young people receiving an education abroad. He called on Georgian parents to not send their
children abroad by pointing to Canada, and implicitly Western culture, as a threat for Georgian traditions. 7 Metropolitan Ioane Gamrekeli echoed the same concerns in 2015: “Instead of the verbal promises Europe demands from us, morally unacceptable relationships are to be acknowledged as a legal norm .” 8 The effective EU and NATO introductory programs organized by the Center for Development and Democracy (CDD) can be considered as a successful policy in response to the Church’s antagonist position toward Europe, illustrated by the Primates’ sermons. 9 But the locum tenens for Patriarch Illia II, Metropolitan Shio Mujiri, is still vague about his position on European values, based on his sermon concerning post-modernism and the European scholarly tradition. 10 To sum up, Georgian primates appear to offer tepid support for the government’s Euro-integration policy. The Holy Synod has made dozens of offensive sermons about Europe, 11 however, which may negatively impact on the European Integration process rather than support it due to the Church influence over the Georgian society.
The concept of secularism demands the separation of church and state at the institutional level. Even though the Georgian constitution stresses the principle of separation, its practical implementation is problematic and such founding principles are often misinterpreted by the Georgian authorities. Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili criticized secularism in its classical sense in 2017: “We believe that our nation features a unique model [of church-state relations] in the world.” 12 The medieval model known as “Church-State Symphony” is still alive in the modern theo-political discourse in Georgia and is often used by religious and political leaders to strengthen their established power. Previously, the Patriarch of Georgia also emphasized the role of religion in Georgian politics as an immutable fact and important for democratic society. 13
Since 1990s the stagnancy in Church-State relationships defends the status quo for GOC to become involved in the Georgian politics. For example, in 2017 the Patriarch’s proposal to discuss the idea of reinstituting the constitutional monarchy was immediately endorsed by Georgian authorities, 14 just as the debate over the decriminalization of drugs 15 was suspended following a proposal by the Church. 16 In both cases, the GOC has managed to exert influence on Georgian politics.
Since 2012 clerical interference in political affairs has become increasingly obvious. Clergies expect the authorities to make decisions in accordance with their confessional viewpoints, mainly anti-Western, arguing that: EU is an attack against Orthodoxy; if we are Orthodox, we should be aligned with Russia, not Europe, etc. 17 Even the Patriarch himself has praised the Russian President Vladimir Putin by saying that “Putin is a wise man who will remedy the situation in Georgia.” 18 Furthermore, in 2014 the Georgian government created the precedent of restoring a soviet-like institution, the State Agency for Religious Issues. The institution is keen to conduct oversight on religions, mainly minorities—an approach, which has been repeatedly criticized by religious communities and civil society 19 .
To summarize, the Church-State relationship in Georgia is closer to the medieval concept of partnership than the secular principles of institutional separation. Political and religious thought is of a particular concern of Church-State overlap. The Georgian government still lacks the readiness to exercise decision-making freedom, especially on issues where religion has a place but not legitimate power. In democratic states government officials separate their personal opinions about religious leaders from public policy. Their viewpoint can be taken along with others or simply rejected.
Weak international links
For the GOC, international links are essential to escape from Russian isolationism. Furthermore, it will be helpful for the Georgian government as well if the GOC makes supportive statements in various international religious forums regarding the state’s European integration policy. However, on May 20, 1997 GOC left the World Council of Churches (WCC) and Conference of European Churches (CEC), two of the leading European church forums and subsequently became a victim of Russian propaganda. 20 Today the GOC is reluctant to actively participate in any ecumenical or inter-faith dialogue formats. For instance, primates from the GOC are taking part in the International Commission for Anglican-Orthodox Theological Dialogue, as one of the ecumenical forums today. This commission issues official theological documents, which have been signed by all its participants including the GOC 21 , but the documents are never easily accessible if at all on the Church official web-pages and the events are not publicized. Furthermore, the Patriarch of Georgia has issued an extraordinary supportive call for Georgian Catholics living in the southern part of Georgia, stating: “Don’t forget that we are the same as
we believe in one God, the Farther, Son and Holy Spirit,” 22 but this position has not been supported by the official position of the GOC. For example, when fundamentalist GOC groups accused the Roman Catholic Pope of being a heretic during his 2016 23 visit to Tbilisi, the Church did not punish any member of the group.
The pan-Orthodox relationship is one of the main concerns of the GOC. In 2016 the GOC suddenly refused to participate in the Crete Counsel without providing a real explanation. 24 This came as a surprise to many Orthodox leaders and the Constantinople Patriarchate, 25 because the inter-faith and even pan-Orthodox relationships are assumed as a way of separating from Russian isolationism in which the GOC has been living for centuries.
Besides, the GOC does not promote Western theological studies. Those who receive diplomas from leading Western theological universities are denied positions in the GOC.
In brief, interfaith dialogue promotes the European values of mutual cooperation to come together across lines of faith and culture. This is a courageous call for religions in 21 st century, which breaks isolation and creates opportunities to learn how to coexistence. If it does not accept this dialogue, the GOC would be isolated from rest of the Christendom and abandoned only to the Russian Theo-imperialistic ideology, that employs the eschatological concept of the Russian state featuring as the “third (and the last) Rome”.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This policy brief presents a bird-eye view of the main problems on a specific set of issues. Based on this analysis, several conclusions can be drawn. First, GOC does not have a well-structured position toward the country’s Europeanisation process. This may negatively impact public opinion about the State’s euro-integration policy. Second, the modern practice of church-state relations in Georgia does not follow the principles of the separation of church and state that are guaranteed by the Georgian Constitution. These principles are abrogated by government officials who accept the Church’s position as “priestly” advice. Finally, the Georgian Orthodox Church’s isolationist, inter-faith policy negatively affects the European integration process, inter alia promoting western values in the Georgian society.
Recommendations for the GOC:
The Holy Synod should respond to inappropriate sermons.
Ecumenical cooperation of the GOC should be publicly reported.
Cooperation with advanced European universities should be improved.
A social doctrine, created in cooperation with the public sector, should be considered a
Recommendations for the government:
The “awkward marriage” between the Georgian Orthodox Church and the government
should be modified according to secular principles.
The Soviet policy regarding religious control, which is conducted by the State Agency for
Religious Issues, must end. The State Agency must only function as a promoter of inter-
religious activity and a facilitator of state-religion affairs.
The government needs to take steps to make sure that inter-religious study is taken
seriously at schools and universities to promote the cultural and religious mediation
process and support tolerance in Georgia's multi-religious society.
Recommendation for civil society:
The social doctrine, a manual for the GOC that outlines its relation with the “outer realm,” (the state and civil society) should be written in cooperation with the public sector. The document should cover the following issues: Church-State relationships; Church and Nationality; Christian Ethics and Human Rights; Church and Secular Education;
Christian Family and Morality; Church and Culture; Church and Inter-Faith/Inter-
Religious Dialogue; Church and Bioethics and etc.
Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP) is a Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan, research and analysis organization. GIP works to strengthen the organizational backbone of democratic institutions and promote good governance and development through policy research and advocacy in Georgia.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Georgian Institute of Politics.
HOW TO QUOTE THIS DOCUMENT:
Vladimer Narsia. "Church and Politics or Church in Politics: How does the Georgian Orthodox Church Impact Georgia’s European Integration Policy?", Policy Brief No. 14, Georgian Institute of Politics, May
Georgian Institute of Politics, 2018
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1 Primates are priests of very high rank in the Christian Church.
2 National Democratic Institute‘s poll (2017, June). Available at: https://new.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20poll_June_2017_Political_ENG_final.pdf
3 DFWatch. (2014, April 30). Orthodox Church against EU in Georgian parliament, Available at: http://dfwatch.net/orthodox-church-against-eu-in-georgian-parliament-57404-28332
4 (2018). მეუფე სპირიდონი 17 მაისის შესახებ. [Online Video]. (2018, May 23). Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYcAd0AwOxQ. (Accessed: 16 January 2018).; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21Kq0HypGX4
5 Patriarch’s response to Mr. Stefan Fule: “...I want to tell you that I am convinced in that for a long time already. See: Civil Georgia. (2014, March 4). Patriarch: 'Church Will Do Everything to Make Georgia EU Member. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27008
6 Civil Georgia. (2014, April 28). Georgian Church Speaks Out Against Anti-Discrimination Bill. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27175
7 Civil Georgia. (2010, October 3). Patriarch: 'Refrain from Sending Kids Abroad for Education. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22722
8 Social Media: Facebook account- The Georgian Way.
9 CDD. (2017). Georgian Orthodox Church visits in Brussels. [Online Video]. 2 January 2017. Available from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btES1DiotG8&feature=youtu.be. (Accessed: 16 January 2018); See also:
“Georgia: Project Aims To Boost Orthodox Church’s Support For EU Integration”. Available at: http://gip.ge/georgia-project-aims-to-boost-orthodox-churchs-support-for-eu-integration/
10 Patriarch’s meeting with clergies and psychologists. 09 Mar 2018. See: http://patriarchate.ge/geo/katolikos-
patriarqis-shexvedra-samghvdeloebastan-da/ [Accessed: 11 March 2018]
11 Lekso Gelashvili. (2018). About Anti-Discrimination Law. [Online Video]. 1 May 2014. Available from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxwDmzoWihU&t=1432s+&+https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv=diu_PDIllvw. [Accessed: 16 January 2018].
12 Civil Georgia. (2017, July 26). CSOs: PM Kvirikashvili’s Church Statements ‘Irresponsible’, Available at:
13 “Kviris Palitra” N31 (224) 2-8 August 1999, p. 8.
14 Jam News, (2017, June 19) Long live the king! Possible restoration of monarchy considered in Georgia! Available
15 First Channel. (2018, January 12). Patriarchate believes that discussion on drug decriminalization should be
suspended. Available at: https://1tv.ge/en/news/patriarchate-believes-discussion-drug-decriminalization-suspended/
16 First Channel. (2018, January 12). Irakli Kobakhidze - Discussion on drug policy should be continued with
everyone, including the Patriarchate. Available, at: https://1tv.ge/en/news/irakli-kobakhidze-discussion-drug-
17 MDF Georgia.See: Ant-Western Propaganda: http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/Antidasavluri-ENG-web.pdf
18 Zviadauri Ilia, (2013, April 15). The Georgian Orthodox Church: Some Aspects of Its Rhetoric and Practice.
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 70 Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-
19 Human Rights Education and Monotoring Center (EMC) Review: Available at: https://emc.org.ge/uploads/products/pdf/February_July_2016.pdf
20 World Council of Church. (2004, January 1). Country Profile: Georgia. Available at:
21 Ecupatria. (2016, October 16). International Commission for Anglican–Orthodox Theo-logical Dialogue
Communiqué. Available at: https://www.ecupatria.org/2016/10/06/international-commission-for-anglican-
22 Journal Jvari Vazisa. Ed. 1998 (1). p.4. (Sermons taken in the villages, called: Ude and Araly)
23 Euronews. (2016). Pope Francis takes first trip to Georgia, but not everyone is happy. [Online Video]. 16 January
2018. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iX_GPNKsV0o. [Accessed: 16 January 2018].
24 Holy Council. 2016. Official Documents of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church. Available at:
25 Interview of the Constantinople Patriarchate on TV Imedi. (2017, December 17) Available
last modified: 18 November 2005
1.1 Security Issues in the Region
The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict
In July 1992 Abkhazian separatists declared their independence from Georgia, leading to a war between the Abkhazians and Georgian Government forces. Supported by volunteers, partly from other countries, Abkhazian forces gained territory within their region. Looking for a way out, Georgia asked Russia to mediate as a regional power. This gave Russia the opportunity to expand its influence on the non-CIS state Georgia. After the failure of the first agreement between the separatists, Georgia and Russia, a second ceasefire was signed by all three parties on July 27th, 1993. The agreement favours the separatist side, which at the present moment controls all of Abkhazia. On May 14th, 1994, the Abkhazian and Georgian parties met in Moscow and signed an agreement on the deployment of CIS peacekeeping troops in the region.
The Georgian-Ossetian conflict
Following ethnic tensions and the abolition of the autonomous status of South Ossetia by the Georgian government in December 1990, Ossetian separatists began an armed revolt in the spring of 1992. They demanded the unification of North and South Ossetia, with the consequence of integrating the region into the Russian Federation. As a result of negotiations between Georgian President Shevarnadze and Russian President Yeltsin a ceasefire agreement was signed in June 1992, and a joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was deployed.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh started in 1988 following a vote by the regional Soviet authorities, that mandated the transfer of the predominantly ethnic Armenian province from Azerbaijan to Armenia. As a result, war broke out in 1989 between Azerbaijani forces and Karabakh militias supported by Armenia. On January 18th, 1992 the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh declared its independence. On May 12th, 1994 a ceasefire agreement was signed with the mediation from Russia.
1.2 International Missions in the Region
*The CSCE renamed itself OSCE at the Budapest Summit in Dec. 1994*
OSCE Mission in Georgia
The OSCE mission in Georgia was established in December 1992 to reach a peaceful political settlement to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and to help define the political status of the South-Ossetian region within Georgia. In Abkhazia the OSCE supports the UN in its efforts to maintain the territorial sovereignty of Georgia, while at the same time taking into account the interests of the Abkhazian population, a position that is expressed in the CSCE Declaration at the Budapest Summit of December 1994. Cooperation between the OSCE and the CIS peacekeeping forces deployed in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an issue that is addressed in Chapter III of the Helsinki Document of 1992. Click here for the OSCE Declaration on Georgia from November 1999. On December 15th, 1999 the mission was extended to monitor the border between Georgia and the Chechen Republic.
The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
UNOMIG was established on August 24th, 1993 by Security Council Resolution 858. Following the Abkhazian-Georgian Agreement signed in Moscow in May 1994, the mandate of UNOMIG was extended by Security Council Resolution 937 (1994), which included the monitoring and verification of the agreement's implementation by the involved parties, as well as providing for cooperation between UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping forces. The mandate of UNOMIG has been repeatedly extended, most recently until January 31st, 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1427 (2002).
In December 2001 the Secretary-General's Special Representative D. Boden presented the document "Basic Principles
for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" to provide a basis for negotiations between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders on the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia. Despite the support of the "Friends of Georgia", a group including the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and Bulgaria, objections are still being made by the Abkhaz side to use the paper as a basis for negotiations.
OSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh
The CSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki decided in March 1992 to convene a conference in order to promote the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Conference did not take place since Azerbaijan wanted the occupied territories to be returned first, but this initiative gave birth to the Minsk Group. The Minsk Group, now comprising Austria, Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the United States as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, aims for a political solution to the conflict and to let the Minsk Conference take place.
The December 1994 Budapest Summit expressed the will to set up a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force in the region. A high-level planning group (HLPG) was established in Vienna to examine the modalities of a deployment if the two conflicting parties reach an agreement. Additionally, a Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the conflict was appointed in August 1995 to assist in achieving this agreement. At the December 1996 Lisbon Summit the Chairman-in-Office defined in a statement, supported by all participating states except Armenia, the principles to be part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The OSCE has so far not managed to reach a consensus on a basis for negotiations between the parties.
1.3 Relations among the Southern Caucasus States and Cooperation in the Context of Regional Organisations
In the Southern Caucasus Armenia remains a close ally of Russia, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan increasingly cooperate with NATO and other international organisations, distancing themselves from Russia.
Armenia wants to keep close relations with Russia to protect itself from potential threats coming from its neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are still problematic regarding the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Click here for a statement by Armenian President R. Kocharian on Nagorno Karabakh.
Georgia maintains good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, stressing the need for cooperation to improve the stability of the Caucasus. Georgia considers strengthening the relations with the European Union and the United States and its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures as a major objective of its foreign policy. From this cooperation, Georgia expects to eventually obtain security guarantees. Click here for references to the EU and the United States in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Azerbaijan follows the same foreign policy line as Georgia, trying to develop close relations with its neighbours Georgia and Turkey, for instance through the agreement on a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project which was signed in 1999. Azerbaijan evoked the possibility of membership in NATO and of accepting NATO military bases on its territory. In view of this, Russia is trying to improve its relations with Azerbaijan.
Regional organisations like GUUAM and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) were created as an alternative to the CIS, which is perceived to be dominated by Russian interests. Both organisations view the future security of the region as depending first upon economic and technical cooperation, as well as the development of infrastructure between the countries in order to facilitate the access to European and international markets. GUUAM countries, particularly Ukraine, are willing to reduce their dependence on energy and pipeline infrastructure from Russia and are therefore promoting a Eurasian Transportation Corridor for energy and goods.
For its part, the BSEC is trying to bring Russia to adopt a cooperative policy towards countries in the Black Sea region. The BSEC, which became an international economic regional organisation in April 1999, is developing communication networks and transport infrastructure between its members.
GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova)
GUAM, an organisation whose name is made up of the initials of its member states, was founded in 1997 by the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Its goal is to establish cooperation between these four states on political, economic and security issues, with the objective of strengthening their independence and sovereignty. During the NATO Summit in Washington in April 1999 Uzbekistan joined the organisation, resulting in the change of the organisation's name from GUAM to GUUAM. On this occasion GUUAM member states expressed their wish to cooperate closely with NATO within the framework of the EAPC and PfP Programmes in a joint statement. Click here for an older GUAM statement on cooperation with NATO (1997).
In the security field, cooperation among GUUAM states is based on a commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts based on a respect for territorial sovereignty. This position includes common peacekeeping activities, the fight against international terrorism and extremism and the adoption of Euro-Atlantic and European structures of security. GUUAM states also expressed their wish to cooperate in the security of transport corridors and pipelines. GUUAM expressed a critical view of the CIS peacekeeping mechanism's efficiency in securing stability in the region in a joint statement at the special meeting of the OSCE security model committee in July 1998.
The New York Memorandum was signed by the Presidents of the GUUAM states on September 6th, 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit in order to institutionalise GUUAM consulting mechanisms. During the Yalta Summit in Ukraine in June 2001 GUUAM member states signed the Yalta Charter (in Russian). Following September 11th, a joint statement was issued with the United States on cooperation to fight terrorism. At the Yalta Summit of July 2002, an agreement establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) was signed by the four countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The ineffectiveness of GUUAM in implementing its decisions since its creation in 1997 was underlined with the decision of Uzbekistan to suspend its membership in the organization in June 2002.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
The BSEC, founded in 1992 by eleven states, is aimed primarily at increasing economic cooperation and development in the Black Sea region. Its membership comprises Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. BSEC objectives are not restricted to the economic field, but consider economic cooperation to be a basis for the promotion of peace and security within the region. The Southern Caucasus states are also trying to increase their cooperation with the European Union through the BSEC. Click here for references to the BSEC in the Foreign Policy Concept of Georgia.
Click here for the Bosphorus Statement of June 25th, 1992 and the Istanbul Summit Declaration of November 18th, 1999.
The Agreement on the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was signed on April 2nd, 2001 in Istanbul by six member states of the BSEC: Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. BLACKSEAFOR will pool the naval forces of these countries in order to respond to emergency situations, its tasks including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine countermeasures and environmental protection. Click here for the statement by Georgian Minister of Defence D. Tevzadze on Blackseafor at the EAPC Meeting of Defence Ministers, June 8th, 2001. A document on confidence- and security-building measures in the Black Sea area was signed in Kiev on April 25th, 2002. In its Istanbul Decennial Summit Declaration of June 2002, the BSEC expressed its will to build stronger ties with the EU.
2. Russia and the Southern Caucasus
Russia tried to keep its historical control of the Caucasus region by integrating the former Soviet Republics into a security system in which it took the role of a "security manager". However, the CIS did not succeed at gaining credibility as a regional peacekeeping system, which gave some member states the incentive to explore other options for conflict settlement. Some of the CIS member states are opening up to the influence of Western organisations (primarily to NATO), and are furthermore seeking alliances with neighbouring states like Turkey as well as cooperating in subregional organisations like GUUAM.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the presence of U.S. military advisers in Georgia appears to be further reducing Russian influence in the region. At the US-Russian Summit of May 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin recognized in a joint declaration the common interest of their countries in the stability and security of Central Asia and the Caucasus and affirmed cooperation in the resolution of regional conflicts.
2.1 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
The Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed on December 8th, 1991 by the presidents of Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine. Later on the Almaty Declaration and Protocol to the Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States was adopted on December 21st, 1991 by the eleven republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as an observer. Azerbaijan joined the CIS on September 24th, 1993 and Georgia on December 9th, 1993.
The CIS Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on May 15th, 1992 by six of its members: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus joined later.
However, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan decided in April 1999 not to renew the CIS Collective Security Treaty.
Click here for an overview on membership of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty.
The activities of this group have concentrated on two issues: peacekeeping operations and the fight against terrorism.
An Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS was signed during the Kiev Summit on March 20th, 1992 by all CIS members except Turkmenistan.
A CIS Antiterrorist Center was established on December 1st, 2000 during the CIS Summit Meeting in Minsk. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine expressed reservations to the founding of this organisation, and refused to participate in all of its prescribed activities. On May 25th, 2001 the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty met in Yerevan and issued a joint statement in which they declared international terrorism and extremism to be a major challenge to the security of CIS countries.
References to the CIS in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2000
2.2 Relations with Southern Caucasus states
Following its independence in April 1991, Georgia accused Russia of supporting the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia in order to destabilise the country's internal political situation. In Georgia's view, it was the aim of Russia to thereby strengthen its influence in the region. At the same time, Georgia is in a position to accept the military presence of the CIS peacekeeping forces within its territory in order to maintain the ceasefire in Abkhazia. This presence implies a degree of Russian political and military influence within Georgia.
The following issues are now determining the relations between Russia and Georgia:
The withdrawal by the Russian Federation of troops and military equipment from Georgia
In the context of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) undertaken during the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw part of its military equipment from Georgian territory in a joint statement with Georgia. Russia undertook to close the military bases of Gudauta and Vaziani by July 1st, 2001, while Georgia granted Russia the right to basic temporary deployment at the bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. But as of now, Russia is still procrastinating on the withdrawal from Gudauta. In the NATO Prague Summit Declaration adopted on November 21st, 2002, the Russian government was urged to fulfil the Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova.
Tension over border control
The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge and of Georgian armed groups in the Kodori valley is a primary source of tension between Russia and Georgia. The Pankisi gorge, a region bordering Chechnya, became a home for Chechen refugees following the Chechen war. The Kodori valley is the only area in Abkhazia, which is still under the control of the Georgian government. The Russian government repeatedly accused the Georgian government of allowing Chechen fighters to use the Pankisi gorge as a safe haven and announced their intention to lead a counterterrorist operation in this area. The Georgian government, for its part, denounced the attempt made by the Russian government to interfere with its sovereignty. Following September 11th and in the context of the U.S. military aid to Georgia regarding counterterrorist activities, the mutual accusations are intensifying.
Two issues are raised by Russia in its criticism of Georgian policy
a) The presence of Chechen rebels in the Pankisi gorge
In an official declaration regarding an incident on the Russian-Georgian border dating back to 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry urged the Georgian government to cooperate in operations against terrorist activities. Following September 11th, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning of the spread of international terrorism into Georgian territory. The Russian Foreign Ministry asked repeatedly for the extradition of Chechen rebels arrested by Georgian border guards while crossing the Russian-Georgian border, most recently in August 2002. The refusal by the Georgian government led the Russian government to question Georgia´s goodwill in participating in the fight against international terrorism.
On August 25th the Georgian government, under the leadership of Georgian law-enforcement agencies, launched a security operation in the Pankisi gorge. In an appeal to the UN Secretary General and to the UN Security Council and heads of OSCE countries on September 12th Russian President V. Putin criticized the Georgian security operation which failed to arrest the Chechen fighters and international terrorists who allegedly moved to other areas. He declared the intention of the Russian government to expand its anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya to the Georgian territory by citing UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) on anti-terrorism and the right of "self-defense" under the UN Charter. This appeal followed a statement by V. Putin in Sochi on September 11th, threatening to launch preemptive strikes against Chechen fighters in the Pankisi gorge, which provoked a prompt reaction from the Georgian side in a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry. The Russian Duma declared in a statement on September 13th its support for a Russian military operation in the Pankisi gorge. Already on August 26th the Russian Foreign Ministry called in a statement for a joint Georgian-Russian counterterrorist operation in the area.
During a meeting in Chisinau on October 6th, Russian President V. Putin and Georgian President E. Shevarnadze agreed in a joint statement on joint military patrols of the Russian-Georgian border and on closer cooperation between their countries´ special services. On this occasion Georgian President E. Shevarnadze announced the extradition of the 13 Chechen suspects detained in Georgian custody since August 2002 to Moscow on terrorism charges. After the extradition of five detainees, the Georgian government suspended its decision to hand over the remaining eight suspects to the Russian authorities following an appeal from the European Court of Human Rights. The recent Moscow hostage crisis in October 2002 renewed the pressure of Russian authorities on Georgia to extradite the Chechen suspects still in custody. After having received guarantees from the Russian government regarding the future treatment of the prisoners, the European Court of Human Rights announced in a communique on November 26th that it no longer has any objection to the extradition of the Chechen suspects.
On December 7th, an anti-crime operation was conducted by Georgian law-enforcers in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi resulting in the arrests of 80 people and the extradition to Russia of one Chechen suspected of being involved in the Moscow apartment house bombings of 1999. The Georgian Ministry of State Security disclosed in January 2003 classified materials, including video tapes, in proof of the presence of Chechen and Arab fighters and their training camps in the Pankisi Gorge.
See EurasiaNet Pankisi Gorge Archive.
b) The support for armed groups in the Kodori valley
A series of incidents in the Kodori valley of Abkhazia, ranging from the shooting down of a UN helicopter and violation of Georgian airspace by Russian military jets in October and November 2001 to a quick deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in April 2002, led to tensions between Russia and Georgia. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing the Georgian policy of tolerance towards terrorist groups. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted by accusing Russia of interfering with its sovereignty in a statement on October 10th, 2001 and a following statement on November 28th, 2001. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued another statement on September 3rd in reaction to the civil casualties resulting from a bombing raid by the Russian military aircraft on Georgian territory on August 23rd.
In the context of alleged support by the Georgian government to guerrilla groups, Russia accused Georgia of increasing the instability in the Kodori valley as preparation for military operations in Abkhazia. In a statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry these accusations were rejected as groundless and mainly motivated by Russian concerns over Georgian-American military cooperation in counter-terrorist activities.
c) Special visa regime for breakaway regions
In December 2000, the Russian Federation granted a special visa arrangement to the Abkhazian and South-Ossetian regions, which undermined Georgia's control over transit across its borders.
In January 2000 Russia expressed its readiness to act as a guarantor if a settlement to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict could be reached. In this way, Russia hoped to regain influence over Azerbaijan and to profile itself as a peacemaker in the region.
3. NATO and the Caucasus
3.1 Cooperation between the Southern Caucasus states and NATO
The signing of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document by Azerbaijan on May 4th, 1994, by Georgia on May 23rd, 1994 and by Armenia on October 5th, 1994 institutionalised the cooperation of the Southern Caucasus states with NATO. This strategy of cooperation had first been developed within the EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Joint Council). The Southern Caucasus countries have recently begun to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR), Azerbaijan having troops within the Turkish Battalion. Click here for references to NATO international peacekeeping forces in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Click here for the statements by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Azerbaijan on NATO's role in the Caucasus at the meeting of the EAPC on December 15th, 2000 and references to NATO in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On September 13th, 2002 the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the Georgian government to take the necessary steps to start the accession process to NATO. On October 1st, a memorandum of understanding on logistic cooperation was signed between Georgia and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO), opening the way for the implementation of a PfP Trust Fund Project for the demilitarization and disposal of missile stockpiles and the remediation of Georgian military sites. Georgia and Azerbaijan officially applied for joining NATO at the NATO Prague Summit of November 21st-22nd, 2002 as declared in a statement by Georgian President E. Shevarnadze and a statement by the President of Azerbaijan H. Aliyev.
3.2 U.S. Interests in the Caucasus
In the Caucasus - and generally in the Caspian area - the objective of the U.S. until recently was primarily to maintain access to the region, particularly to its oil and gas resources, while at the same time avoiding involvement in regional conflicts or direct confrontation with other major powers. The United States is mainly interested in assuring the security conditions that are necessary for oil production and export.
However, this policy of neutrality is likely to change with the sending of U.S. military advisers to Georgia in April 2002.
U.S. involvement in the Caucasus
Following September 11th the United States increased its involvement in the Caucasus. Click here for a statement on U.S. Policy in the Caucasus by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, E. Jones, from March 13th, 2002.
The U.S. policy in the Caucasus focuses on two issues:
Counterterrorism: With the Georgian Train-and-Equip Program, which was launched on April 29th, 2002, the United States offered military assistance in counter-terrorism to Georgia in response to the growing instability of the Pankisi Valley, a region bordering Chechnya on Georgian territory. At the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002 the United States affirmed its commitment to work along with Russia on the elimination of terrorism in Georgia in a joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on counterterrorism cooperation. In a statement on September 14th, U.S. President G. W. Bush affirmed its full support for the Georgian government security operation in the Pankisi gorge and appealed to Russian President V. Putin to allow the Georgian government to fulfill this task. On September 26th the U.S. Mission to the OSCE outlined in a statement the opposition of the United States to any unilateral Russian military action inside Georgian territory. Click here for a description of terrorist activities in Georgia in the report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001-Eurasia Overview issued by the U.S. Department of State on May 24th, 2002. See the testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs L. Pascoe from September 24th, 2002 for an overview of Georgia´s strategic importance for the United States.
Resolution of regional conflicts: The United States stressed the need for a political settlement of the conflicts in the region and affirmed its readiness to cooperate with Russia on this issue in a joint declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin at the U.S.-Russian Summit of May 2002.
The transport of Caspian energy resources to international markets is an issue that involves the interests of all major powers acting in the region: Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran and China. The aim of U.S. involvement in oil production and export in the Caspian Region is to reduce the its future dependence on oil resources in the Persian Gulf. The two major oil exporting countries in the Caspian region are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In 1994 the Azeri State Oil Company (SOCAR) signed the "Contract of the Century" with an international consortium of foreign oil companies.
Under the Clinton Administration, a Caspian energy diplomacy effort was initiated as described in a statement by the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy diplomacy, J. Wolf, from October 4th, 2000. A general description of the U.S. interests in the Caspian region can be found in a statement by Under Secretary S. Eizenstat on Caspian energy development from October 23rd, 1997. The Clinton Administration followed a "Caspian strategy", which consisted in the promotion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline through Turkey. An alternative to this plan would be the Baku-Supsa route on the Georgian Black Sea coast. For its part, Russia is seeking to promote the use of the existing oil pipeline which runs through Grozny between Baku and Novorossiysk on the Russian Black Sea coast. This option has the advantage of being cheaper than the construction of a new pipeline through Georgia, but both the United States and the countries in the region are trying to avoid a Russian monopoly. Also, due to the volatile political situation there, the route through Chechnya is not secure; the pipelines have been subject to numerous terrorist attacks during the Chechen crisis. The security of pipelines is of concern to all of the countries involved, as pipelines can become the target for terrorist activities. Click here for references to pipeline security in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In September 2001, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. This agreement was welcomed in a statement by the U.S. Department of State.
There seems to be a general preference for the existence of multiple pipelines because this would allow the Caspian states to escape foreign influence and to facilitate their global economic integration. In a joint statement of U.S. President G.W. Bush and Russian President V. Putin at the U.S.-Russia summit of May 2002, a New Energy Dialogue between the United States and Russia was announced, centering on cooperation in their energy sectors by promoting joint projects. On November 22nd, a joint statement was made in St. Petersburg on the first results in the development of the U.S.-Russian Energy Dialogue.
Map of existing and proposed pipelines in the Caspian region
Two main projects are emerging from the different options:
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Project: During the OSCE Istanbul Summit on November 17th, 1999 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan framework agreements were signed. This route would make it possible to link Georgia and Azerbaijan with NATO ally Turkey and, consequently, with the West. Despite objections based on its commercial viability, the construction of the pipeline will begin soon. An official ceremony was held in Baku in September 2002 to mark the start of its construction. The U.S. Department of State welcomed the official approval of the Georgian government of the BTC oil pipeline in a press statement. The Bush Administration is now actively supporting the development of a Aktau-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route, which would allow the inclusion of Kazakhstan in the BTC project.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Project: The CPC Project involves the governments of Kazakhstan, Russia and Oman as well as American oil companies (Chevron and ExxonMobil). The CPC Project was officially launched in November 2001 and welcomed in a statement by U.S. President G.W. Bush as a means to enhance U.S. energy security. The CPC pipeline links the Tengiz oil field in western Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Anapa on the Black Sea Coast.
Support for NIS sovereignty
Until recently U.S. policy was to help the Newly Independent States (NIS) to assert their independence and sovereignty and to escape the influence of Russia, as expressed in a statement by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser for the NIS States S. Sestanovich on U.S. Policy Toward Russia from July 16th, 1998. The U.S. Department of State criticized the Russian Federation's threat to the territorial sovereignty of Georgia following the war in Chechnya. Click here for a selection of Press statements by the U.S. Department of State on the following topics:
Russian Bombing of Georgia, August 24th, 2002
Helicopters entering Georgian air space from Russian territory, November 28th, 2001
Russian Imposition of Visa Regime for Georgia, December 5th, 2000
OSCE Monitoring of Russian-Georgian Border, February 23rd, 2000
4. Cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe
Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe in April 1999. Accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been voted respectively on January 17th and January 25th, 2001.
The European Union (EU) signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia during the visit of the three Caucasian presidents in Luxembourg in April 1996, which entered into force on July 1st, 1999. The EU is active in the Caucasus along two different lines:
Cooperation with the OSCE: The EU cooperates with the OSCE in the Caucasus by promoting confidence-building and through the implementation of special actions in conflict areas. The European Union supplied equipment to the Georgian Border Guard on the Chechen border in order to support OSCE monitoring operations and signed an assistance agreement with the OSCE in December 2001. The EU Presidency issued two declarations respectively on August 12th and August 28th on the violations of the Georgian airspace by military aircraft. The EU expressed its concern over the exacerbation of tension between Russia and Georgia and declared its support to the Georgian government in its efforts to restore order in the Pankisi valley.
The TRACECA Programme: The EU is supporting the project of a transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia through the Caucasus.
Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Statement at the EAPC Summit Meeting, Prague, 22 November 2002
Minister of Defence of Georgia D. Tevzadze: EAPCs Role in the International Fight Against Terrorism, Meeting of the EAPC in Defence Ministers session, Brussels, 7 June 2002
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia I. Menagarishvili: Statement at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Rekyavik, 15 May 2002
Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.Menagarishvili: Speech at the EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, 7 December 2001
Georgian President E. Shevarnadze: Address to the Conference "Georgia and its Partners: Directions for the New Millennium", Tbilisi, 5 October 2000
Secretary General of NATO G. Robertson at the Conference "Caucasus today: Perspectives of Regional Cooperation and Partnership with the NATO", Tbilisi, 26 September 2000
Larsson, R.L.: Georgia´s Missing Security Compass, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 2 July 2003
Darchiashvili, D.: Dilemmas for the Future of Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 May 2003
Devdariani, J.: Georgia on a Fault Line, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 3, January-February 2003
Anjaparidze, Z.: Will Georgia cut the Pankisi knot?, The Jamestown Foundation Russian and Eurasian Review, Vol. 1/Issue 12, 19 November 2002
Baran, Z.: Despite ongoing Russian Pressure, Time for Real Change in Georgia, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 November 2002
Di Puppo, L.: Die Pankisi Schlucht und die russisch-georgischen Beziehungen, antimilitarismus information 11/02, November 2002 (German only)
Blank, S.: The Russian Bourbons: Civil-Military Relations and Pressure on Georgia, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
Blum, D.: The Russian-Georgian Crisis and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 252, October 2002
Baev, P.: Russia´s Virtual War against Georgia: Risks of a PR Offensive, CSIS Russia/Eurasia Program, PONARS Policy Memo No 251, October 2002
Devdariani, J.: Georgia Reacts to Russian Pressure, Perspective, Vol. XIII/No. 1, September-October 2002
Hancilova, B.: Russia´s Grab for Pankisi: Domestic Diversion or Oil Politics?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
Bayran, Z.: Georgian-Russian Tension on the Rise, CSIS - Georgia Update, 21 August 2002
Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge - Russian, U.S. and European Connections, Center for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No 23, June 2002
Baev, P.: Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and the Global War against Terrorism, Summary of Event, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 12 April 2002
Baran, Z.: Tension Increasing in Abkhazia - Georgia Restates Commitment to Non-Military Solution, CSIS - Georgia Update, 1 April 2002
Schmidt, Jürgen: Krieg gegen den Terrorismus im Südkaukasus ? Die USA entsenden Militärberater nach Georgien, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 22 March 2002 (German only)
Baran, Z.: United States Will Help Georgia Fight Terrorism and Strengthen Internally, CSIS - Georgia Update, 4 March 2002
Blandy, C.W.: Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters, Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2002
Kurtsikidze, S. / Chikovani, V.: Georgia´s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Spring 2002
Areshidze, I.G.: Helping Georgia ?,Perspective, Vol. XII/No. 4, February-March 2002
Blank, Stephen: The Prospects of Russian-American Partnership: The Georgian Litmus Test, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 30 January 2002
Pataraia, T.: Impact of the Conflict in Chechnya on Georgian Security System, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
Feinberg, J.: The Armed Forces in Georgia, CDI Monograph, Center for Defense Information, March 1999
2. Regional conflicts
Martirosyan, T.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Toward Stalemate or Settlement ?, The Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol 2, Issue 1, 7 January 2003
Ismailzade, F: Latest Efforts to Solve Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute Fails, Killing Talk of Economic Cooperation, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 9 October 2002
Martirosyan, T.: Land Swap in Nagorno-Karabakh: Much Noise over an Unrealistic Option, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 14 August 2002
Ismailzade, F.: The OSCE Minsk Group: Is There Space for Improvement ?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 June 2002
Shahnazarian, D.: Prospects for the Peaceful Resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 5 June 2002
Baev, P./Koehler, J./Zuercher, C.: Civil Wars in the Caucasus, World Bank Development Economics Research Group (DECRG)/Yale University, UN Studies Program, 15 March 2002
Cvetovski, N.: The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Dissertation Aalborg University, 13 March 2002
Sabanadze, N: International Involvement in the South Caucasus, European Center for Minority Issues, ECMI Working Paper # 15, February 2002
Amirbayov, E.: Shusha's Pivotal Role in a Nagorno-Karabagh Settlement, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 6, December 2001
Darchiashvili, D.: Some considerations about ways to solve the conflict in Abkhazia, Caucasian Institute For Peace, Democracy and Development, 14 March 2001
Tavitian, N.: An irrestible force meets an immovable object: The Minsk Group negotiations on the status of Nagorno Karabakh, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/00, 2000
Cohen, J. (ed): A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, Accord 7, Conciliation Resources, September 1999 (Russian version)
Coppieters, B. / Darchiashvili, D. / Akaba, N. (eds): Federal Practice - Exploring alternatives for Georgia and Abkhazia, Vrije Universiteit Brussel University Press, 1999
Carley, P.: Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 25, December 1998
Coppieters, B. / Nodia, G. / Anchabadze, Y. (eds): Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement, Caucasian Regional Studies Vol. 3, No 2 & 3, August 1998
Derluguian, G.M.: The Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since and the Soviet Collapse, in: Crawford, B. / Lipschutz, R.D. (ed.): The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence, University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #98, 1998
Manutscharjan, A.: Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven, ZEI Discussion Paper C 18, Center for European Integration Studies, 1998 (German only)
Hansen, G.: Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, Occasional Paper No 32, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1998
Nodia, G.: Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Winter 1997-1998
MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L. / Shenfield, S.: Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Occasional Paper No 21, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996
MacFarlane, N. / Minear, L: Humanitarian Action and Politics: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Occasional Paper No 25, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1996
3. Southern Caucasus
Huseyinov, T.: Towards Crafting a National Security Doctrine in Azerbaijan, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 26 March 2003
Ismailova, G.: Will Azerbaijan Join The War on Iraq?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 29 January 2003
Cohen, A.: Regional Security Implications of the Moscow Hostage-Taking, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 20 November 2002
Devdariani, J./ Hancilova, B.: U.S. Involvement in Caucasian Security Architecture Grows, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 23 October 2002
"South Caucasus and the Caspian: A View from Baku", Adress by I. Aliyev, Summary of Event, BSCIA Caspian Studies Program, 22 October 2002
Linotte, D./ Aune, L.: The GUUAM Free Trade Agreement: A Concrete Step Forward, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 25 September 2002
Blank, S.: The Future of Transcaspian Security, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Regional Studies, August 2002
Valiyev, A.: Azerbaijani-Turkmen Relations: Quarreling Brothers, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 July 2002
Sherr, J.: Democracy in the Black Sea Region: The Missing Link in Regional Security, Conflict Studies Research Center, July 2002
Blank, S.: U.S. Military in Azerbaijan To Counter Iranian Threat, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 10 April 2002
Ulusoy, H.: A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
Ferrari, M.-P.: Les Républiques du Caucase entre passé soviétique et mondialisation, Mémoire, Institut Européen des Hautes Études Internationales Nices, 2002 (French only)
Black Sea Basin regional profile: The security situation and the region-building evolution of South-Eastern Europe, Institute for Security and International Studies, Research Study 13, January-March 2002
Shaffer, B.: U.S. Policy toward the Caspian Region: Recommendations for the Bush Administration, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
Baev, P.: Russia Refocuses its Policies in the Southern Caucasus, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2001
U.S.-Russian Relations: Implications for the Caspian Region (Conference Report), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, 11 July 2001
Fairbanks, C. / Nelson, R. / Starr, F. / Weisbrode, K.: Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States / Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, January 2001
Valášek, T.: Military Cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova in the GUUAM Framework, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 2, December 2000
Smith, M.: Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad, Conflict Studies Research Center, December 2000
Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics, Conference Report, National Intelligence Council, October 2000
Blank, S.: U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2000
Herd, G. / Moustakis, F.: Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas, Obstacles & Prospects, Conflict Studies Research Center, June 2000
A Stability Pact for the Caucasus, Center for European Policy Studies, Working Document No.145, May 2000
New Political Aspects of GUUAM development, Monitoring - Foreign & Security Policy of Ukraine, Occasional Paper 48/00, 2000
Oliker, O.: Ukraine and the Caspian - An Opportunity for the United States, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 2000
Lanskoy, M.: Anti-Terrorism as Pretext: Russia taking Aim at the South Caucasus?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, February 2000
Thomas, T.: Russian National Interests and the Caspian Sea, Foreign Military Studies Office, 1999-2000
Alieva, L.: Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in post-Soviet South Caucasus, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000
Sokolsky, R. / Charlick-Paley, T.: NATO and Caspian security: A Mission Too Far?, RAND - Center for Russia and Eurasia, 1999
Blank, S.: NATO after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 1998
Garnett, S.W.: Russia and its Borderlands: A Geography of Violence, U.S. Army War College, Parameters, Spring 1997
Hopmann, T./Shenfield, S./Arel, D.: Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security, Occasional Paper No 30, Watson Institute for International Studies, 1997
4. Caspian Pipelines
Tsereteli, M.: Russia Close to Regaining Control over Strategic Georgian Assets, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 11 September 2002
Aliriza, B. / Ciftci, S.: Turkey´s Caspian Energy Quandry, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 13 August 2002
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey Pipelines project - Georgian Section, International Fact Finding Mission Preliminary Report, CEE Bankwatch Network, 31 July 2002
Allison, G. / Grennan, J.: U.S. Policy on Russian and Caspian Oil Exports: Addressing America's Oil Addiction, Discussion Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, July 2002
Spector, R.: The North-South Transport Corridor, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 3 July 2002
Müller, F.: Entwicklungspotentiale und Wirtschaftsinteressen, Jour Fixe Zentralasien / Kaukasus, SWP-Brennpunkte, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 16 June 2002 (German only)
Kiesling, L. / Becker, J.: Russia's Role in the Shifting World Oil Market, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program Policy Brief No 8, May 2002
Kochladze, M.: Pocketing Caspian Black Gold: Who are the Real Beneficiaries of Oil Infrastructure Development in Georgia and Azerbaijan?, Transnational Institute / CEE Bankwatch Network, April 2002
Udum, S.: The Politics of Caspian Region Energy Ressources: A Challenge for Turkish Foreign Policy, Perceptions, Vol VI / No 4, December 2001- February 2002
Cutler, R.: The Caspian Pipeline Consortium Beats the Skeptics, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, 12 September 2001
McKeeby, D.: "Crude Business": Corruption and Caspian Oil, CSIS - Caspian Energy Update, 1 September 2001
Pamir, N.: Turkey: The Key to Caspian Oil and Gas, IASPS Strategic Research Papers, September 2001
Allison, G. / Van Buskirk, E.: Mini-Case and Illustrative Paradigm, U.S. Policy on Caspian Energy Development and Exports, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Caspian Studies Program, May 2001
Walters, J.: Caspian Oil and Gas: Mitigating Political Risks for Private Participation, World Bank Group, June 2000
Cordersman, A.H.: The US Government View of Energy Developments in the Caspian, Central Asia and Iran, CSIS, 27 April 2000
Rubin, Vadim: The Geopolitics of Energy Development in the Caspian Region: Regional Cooperation or Conflict ?, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), December 1999
Rosenthal, S.: NATO, Russia, and Oil pipelines, Stratfor, 15 June 1999
Joseph, J.: Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Case Studies in International Diplomacy, Case 1/99, 1999
Cohen, A.: The New "Great Game": Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1065, 25 January 1996
Raptis, K.: Nagorno Karabakh and the Eurasian Transport Corridor, Occasional Paper, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), March 1998
Oil and Gas Resources of the Fergana Basin (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, December 1994
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