Major battle between the Georgian troops led by Giorgi Saakadze and Eristavi Zurab of Aragvi and the Persian forces led by Qarcheghai Khan. In 1624, Shah Abbas I, victorious on all fronts, turned his attention to Georgia. He dispatched some 35,000 men under Qarcheghai Khan and Giorgi Saakadze to subdue eastern Georgia; not trusting Saakadze completely, Shah Abbas kept his son Paata as a hostage. The Shah’s anxiety was justified since Saakadze maintained covert communications with Georgian forces and devised a plan to destroy the enemy army. It was agreed that Saakadze would exterminate the Persian leadership and coordinate an attack of the main Georgian forces.

As the Persian army camped near Martkopi on 25 March 1625, Saakadze summoned the Persian war council where he personally slew Qarcheghai Khan, while his son, Avtandil, and his Georgian escorts killed other Persian commanders. Receiving a signal, Eristavi Zurab charged with his main forces, and the leaderless Persian troops were virtually annihilated. Taking advantage of his success, Saakadze and Eristavi Zurab then raised a rebellion in Kartli, captured Tbilisi and expanded their campaign to Kakheti and Ganja-Karabagh. Saakadze invited King Teimuraz of Kakheti to take the crown of Kartli and, thereby, united both principalities.

Decisive battle between the Persian and Georgian armies on 1 July 1625. In response to Persian encroachments on eastern Georgia, the Great Mouravi, Giorgi Saakadze, raised a rebellion in Kartli in the spring of 1625 and annihilated a Persian army in the battle of Martkopi on 25 March. He went on to capture Tbilisi and campaign in Kakheti, Ganja-Karabagh and Akhaltsikhe. King Teimuraz of Kakheti was invited to take the crown of Kartli and thereby unite both principalities. In response, Shah Abbas I dispatched a large Persian army to destroy the insurgents. The Persians entered Kartli in late June 1625 and bivouacked on the Marabda Field while the Georgian army took up positions in the Kodjori-Tabakhmela Valley. At the council of war, Giorgi Saakadze urged King Teimuraz and other lords to remain in position and wage a guerilla war since descending into the valley would allow the Persians to take advantage of their numerical superiority as well as firepower. However, powerful lords, especially the Baratashvilis, were concerned about the Persians ravaging their estates and threatened to defect unless the battle was given at once. Thus, Saakadze was overruled and King Teimuraz ordered the attack on 1 July 1625.

The Persians, armed with the latest gunpowder weaponry, were well prepared for the assault. Georgians, lacking firearms, suffered heavy casualties as their charged, but the impetus of their attack pierced the Persian lines and spread confusion among the enemy. As the Persians began to flee, a small group of Georgian troops pursued them while others began to plunder the Persian camp. At this moment, the Persian reinforcements arrived charging the befuddled Georgians; in the resultant confusion, Lord Teimuraz Mukhranbatoni was killed but the rumor spread that King Teimuraz had been killed, further demoralizing the Georgian host. The Georgians were defeated, losing about 10,000 killed and wounded; among the dead were the nine brothers Kherkheulidze who defended the royal banner to the last. The Persians suffered heavy losses as well, losing some 14,000 men. Following the battle, Saakadze again led the Georgian resistance and turned to guerrilla war, eliminating some 12,000 Persians in the Ksani Valley alone. His successful guerilla warfare frustrated Shah Abbas’ plans to destroy the eastern Georgian states and set up Qizilbash khanates on Georgian territory.

Major battle between the Georgian forces of King Luarsab I of Kartli and the Persian troops led by Shahverdi Sultan, beglarbeg of Ganja. In 1555, the Ottoman Empire and Persia concluded the Treaty of Amassia which partitioned Georgia between the two powers. Shah Tahmasp of Persia immediately set out to claim the eastern provinces of Georgia and dispatched Shahverdi Sultan, beglarbeg of Ganja with the Persian army to conquer Kartli. The enemy invasion was routed by King Luarsab and his son Simon at the village of Garisi, but Luarsab himself died in the battle.

A major battle between the alliance of Georgia and Shirvan and the rising Kara Koyunlu Turkmen near Chalagan (the present day Chalagan-Gyuney, Azerbaijan) in 1412. Timur's campaigns in the Caucasus and Near East in the early 1400s weakened the power of the Ottoman Turks and led to the rise of various tribes. The Kara Koyunlu (Black Sheep) tribal federation was among those benefiting from the political vacuum Timur's campaigns created and the Kara Koyunlu tribesmen, led by a talented Kara Yusuf, did not waste time in seizing control of southern Azerbaijan by 1406. Shervanshah Ibrahim I (1382-1417) of Shirvan (in northern Azerbaijan) was threatened by the Kara Koyunlu expansion, especially after the defection of his former ally, Yar Ahmed Karamanlu of Karabakh. In 1412, Ibrahim appealed for help to King Constantine I of Georgia and, aided by Sidi Ahmed Orlat of Shaki, the Georgian-Shirvani-Shaki alliance troops marched against the Kara Koyunlu. While the size of the armies involved in this battle is unclear, the sources seem to agree that the Georgian detachment consisted of about 2,000 warriors.

The battle was fought near the village Chalagan in December 1412 and resulted in a decisive defeat of the allies. King Constantine and several dozen Georgian troops were captured and beheaded on Kara Yusuf's orders. The battle strengthened the Kara Koyunlu's positions in southern Caucasus and exposed Georgia to the eventual raids by the Turkmen tribesmen.

Decisive battle between the Georgian forces and Jalāl al-Dīn’s Khwarazmean forces in 1227(or 1228). Following the Mongol invasions of Central Asia, Jalāl al-Dīn, the surviving prince of the Khwarazmean empire, led his troops against Georgia in 1226–1226, and ravaged eastern Georgia and sacked Tbilisi. In 1227, the Georgians joined forces with the neighboring Muslim rulers of Rüm and Shaharmens against the invader. However, Jalāl al-Dīn anticipated their moves and intercepted the Georgian forces moving southward near Bolnisi. Outnumbered and without reinforcements, the Georgians and their North Caucasian allies were decisively defeated. This defeat allowed Jalāl al-Dīn to remain in south Caucasia and continue pillaging eastern Georgia for another four years.

Major battle between the Georgian army led by Ivane Mkhargrdzeli and the Khwarazmean forces of Jalāl al-Dīn. The Khwarazmean forces were displaced by the Mongol invasion of Central Asia, which claimed the powerful Empire of Khwarazm. After escaping to India and then eastern Persia, Jalāl al-Dīn rallied his forces, but instead of engaging the Mongols, he led them against neighboring Georgia. In the summer of 1225, his army of more than 100,000 men (some estimates place its strength at 200,000 men) approached the Georgian borders in Armenia, where Ivane Mkhargrdzeli gathered about 70,000 men. The Georgian advance guard was composed of the Meskhian troops under Lords Shalva and Ivane Akhaltsikheliwhile the main forces were deployed on the hills near Gahrni.

The battle started with the attack of the Georgian advance guard but feuding among the Georgian commanders predetermined the battle outcome. Despite repeated pleas from the Akhaltsikheli brothers, Ivane Mkhargrdzeli refused to commit his forces in support of his rivals and watched as the Khwarazmean troops slaughtered the Meskhs. Ivane Akhaltsikheli fell on the battlefield, while Shalva was captured and later executed. The battle had a tremendous impact on Georgia, which had not experienced foreign invasions for almost a hundred years. The battle effectively signaled the end of the Golden Age of Georgia and the start of a long twilight. Jalāl al-Dīn soon captured Tbilisi and ravaged the country for the next five years until the arrival of the Mongols.