Decisive battle between the Georgians and the Seljuk Turks of Rüm near Basian, in the vicinity of Erzurum (in modern Turkey); the date is usually given as 1203 but recent research suggest that the battle was fought in the summer of 1202. Under the rule of Kings David IV Aghmashenebeli and Giorgi III, Georgia emerged as one of the most powerful states in the Near East. The reign of Queen Tamar (1178–1213) further underscored Georgian might after a large Islamic coalition was crushed in the battle of Shamkhor in 1195. Alarmed by the Georgian success, Sultan Rukn ad-Din Suleiman Shah of Rüm (1196–1204) rallied the forces of the Muslim principalities against Georgia. The massive Islamic army (estimates range between 150,000–400,000 men) advanced toward the Georgian borders in 1203 and was met by the 90,000-strong Georgian army under David Soslani at Basian. The Georgian army was deployed with western (apkhazni da imerni) and eastern (amerni da her-kakhni) Georgian troops on flanks and some 40,000 men under Shalva and Ivane Akhaltsikheili in the center while Zakaria Mkhagrdzeli led the advance guard.

The Georgians initially made an unexpected attack with their advance guard on the Muslim army and spread confusion among the enemy troops. Sultan Rukn ad-Din Suleiman managed to rally his forces and counterattacked but was surprised by coordinated flanking attacks which routed his forces. Still, both sides suffered heavy casualties in the bitterly contested battle. The victory at Basian secured the Georgian preeminence in the region. Exploiting her success in this battle, Queen Tamar annexed Arran and Duin in 1203 and subdued the Emirate of Kars, Armen-Shahs and the emirs of Erzurum and Erzinjan. The Georgians then carried war into Azerbaijan and advanced as far as Ardabil and Tabriz in 1208 and into Qazvin and Khoy in 1210. These victories brought Georgia to the summit of its power and glory, establishing a pan-Caucasian Georgian empire that extended from the Black Sea to the Caspian and from the Caucasus Mountains to Lake Van.

Major battle between the Georgian army and Atabeg Abu-Bakr of Arran in June 1195 near Shamkhor (present day-Shamkir, Azerbaijan). In the mid-1190s, a bitter struggle between Atabeg Abu Bakr of Azerbaijan and Sirvanshah Aghsartan led to the defeat of the latter. Aghsartan, enjoying close relations with the Bagration dynasty, appealed for help to Georgia. In 1195, Queen Tamar dispatched her army under King Consort David Soslan to Shirvan. Atabeg Abu-Bakr rallied the forces of the neighboring Muslim principalities and met the Georgians near Shamkhor in June 1195. In a skillfully executed maneuver, David Soslan directed his troops toward the city of Shamkhor, which was a diversionary move while his main forces made a flanking attack against the Muslim troops. The Atabeg’s forces were surrounded and routed, and the city capitulated some time later. Among the Georgian trophies was the standard of the caliph which was donated to the Kakhuli Monastery. The Georgians launched a vigorous pursuit, seizing the key fortress of Ganja. Queen Tamar restored Aghsartan in Shirvan under the terms of vassalage, thereby greatly expanding her sphere of influence.

Conflict between Georgian and a Muslim coalition on the Didgori Field near Tbilisi in August 1121; the battle is usually considered the greatest Georgian military success. The late 11th century saw the beginning of the so-called Great Turkish Troubles (didi turkoba) in Georgia when the Seljuk tribes arrived in large numbers to settle on Georgian lands and turned the occupied territory into pastures, undermining local agriculture and the economy. Seljuk dominance continued unchecked for almost a decade and devastated the country. In 1089, a bloodless coup d’etat forced King Giorgi II to abdicate in favor of his 16-year-old son David, who quickly rallied his forces to defeat the powerful enemy and rebuild his country. From 1089–1105, King David attacked isolated Seljuk troops and revived the devastated regions; in 1092, he ceased paying the annual tribute to the Seljuks and ended the seasonal migration of the Turks into Georgia. He then continued his expansion throughout southern Transcaucasia, successfully defeating the Seljuk invasions in 1105, 1110, and 1116. King David reorganized the Georgian army, resettling some 40,000 families of Cuman-Qipcaqs from the northern Caucasus, who provided him with a steady supply of manpower. The new army was immediately put to use as King David began to raid the nearby principalities of Shirwan and Great Armenia. He soon asserted his authority over almost the entire southern Transcaucasia, except for Tbilisi, and some regions of the North Caucasus. He also established contact with the Crusaders in the Holy Land, and there is evidence that the two factions tried to coordinate their actions against the Muslims.

The Muslim powers became increasingly concerned about the rapid rise of the Christian state in the southern Caucasus and even considered it a greater threat than the Crusaders in Palestine, whom they managed to contain on the coast. In 1121, Sultan Mahmud b. Muhammad (1118–1131) declared a holy war on Georgia and rallied a large coalition of Muslim states led by the Artuqid Najm al-din El-ğazi and Toğrul b. Muhammad, the Seljuqid ruler of Arran and Nakhichevan; the coalition was also supported by lesser but important local rulers, including the “king of the Arabs” Dubays b. Sadaqa (1108–1135), and Tughan-Arslan, lord of Arzin, Bidlis and Dvin. Najm al-din El-ğazi had just celebrated his great victory over the Crusaders under King Roger of Antioch at Balat in 1119 and enjoyed the reputation of an experienced Muslim commander. The size of the Muslim army is still a matter of debate with numbers ranging from a fantastic 600,000 men (Walter the Chancellor’s Bella Antiochena, Matthew of Edessa) to 400,000 (Smbat Sparapet’s Chronicle) while estimates of Georgian historians vary between 100,000–250,000. All of these numbers are exaggerated and the size of the Muslim army was hardly in six-figure numbers; still all available sources indicate that Muslims made massive preparations, gathered an army that was several times larger than any engaged in the Holy Land, and vastly outnumbered the Georgians. In mid-summer 1121, the Muslim troops advanced along various routes, with part of them passing the provinces of Arsan al Rum (Erserum) and al-Ghars (Kars) while Sultan Toğrul moved through Ganja and Tughan-Arslan the Hunchback marched from Dvin. Entering Georgian territory, they proceeded by the Manglisi-Didgori valley toward Tbilisi. On 10 August, the enormous Muslim army bivouacked on a vast field near Didgori, about a day’s march from Tbilisi.

The Georgians were well aware of the Muslim preparations and took necessary precautions. King David evacuated the regions along the Muslim invasion route and called up his troops. The Georgians mastered some 56,000 men, including 500 Alans and 200 Crusaders, who had arrived from the Holy Land. On 11 August 1121, he led his army along the Nichbisi Valley from the ancient capital of Mtskheta and divided the troops into two parts with a larger group under his personal command; a smaller detachment under his son Demetre was to occupy secretly the nearby heights and strike the enemy flank at a signal. On the royal orders, the Nichbisi Valley, behind the Georgian troops, was blockaded with fallen trees leaving no other choice for the Georgian troops but to fight to the death. According to the French knight and historian Galterii, King David appealed to his warriors just before the battle, “Soldiers of Christ! If we fight with abandon, defending the faith of our Lord, we shall not only overcome the countless servants of Satan, but the Devil himself. I will only advise you one thing that will add to our honor and our profit: raising our hands to Heaven we will all swear to our Lord that in the name of love to Him, we will rather die on the battlefield than run.”

The Georgian battle plan involved a cunning move. On the morning of 12 August, some 200 cavalrymen departed the Georgian camp and rode to the enemy side, indicating they wanted to defect. The Muslim commanders, surprisingly, not only allowed them into the camp but also gathered to meet them. At a signal, the Georgians suddenly unsheathed their swords and attacked them, killing and wounding most of them. Observing the confusion in the enemy camp, King David ordered a general attack on the enemy positions while his son Prince Demetre charged the enemy flank. With their leadership in disarray, the Muslims in the frontline failed to organize any resistance, while those in the back soon became so disorganized that the entire battle lasted only three hours before the enemy army fled in disorder. According to the Georgian chronicler, King David’s troops pursued them for three days, “putting all of them to the sword and leaving them to the carnivorous beasts and birds of the mountains and plains.” The Armenian historian Matthews wrote that “terrible and savage slaughter of the enemy troops ensued and the [enemy] corpses filled up the rivers and covered all valleys and cliffs,” and claimed that less than a hundred men survived from every thousand. The Muslim commander-in-chief El-ğazi himself was wounded and fled with the few surviving escorts while his son-in-law Dubays b. Sadaqa barely escaped after having his necklace torn off his neck (it was later donated to the Gelati Monastery). The Georgians captured the entire enemy camp and the fabulous riches it contained.

Following his success, King David seized Tbilisi, the last Muslim enclave remaining from the Arab occupation, in 1122 and moved the Georgian capital there. In 1123–1124, Georgian armies were victorious in the neighboring territories of Armenia, Shirwan, and northern Caucasus, greatly expanding Georgia’s sphere of influence. A contemporary chronicler marveled, “What tongue can relate the wonders which our sustaining Christ gave us on that day? And what are the narrations of Homer and Aristotle to me about the Trojan War and the bravery of Achilles or Josephus' writings about the valor of the Maccabees or Alexander and Titus at Jerusalem?” The battle entered the Georgian national conscience as “the miraculous victory” (dzlevai sakvirveli) and is without doubt one of the apogees of Georgian history. It signaled the emergence of Georgia as a great military power in the late 11th–12th centuries and shifted the balance in favor of Georgian cultural and political supremacy in south Caucasia and the Near East.

Battle between the armies of King Bagrat IV (1027–1072) of Georgia and the powerful Lord Liparit IV Baghvashi of Kldekari at the village of Sasireti, near modern Kaspi. A dispute between King Bagrat IV and Lord Liparit Baghvashi gradually developed into a bitter struggle over power. In his youth, Bagrat had been held hostage in Constantinople after his father King Giorgi I (1014–1027) lost the first Georgian-Byzantine War for the southwestern Georgian lands. Ascending the throne in 1027, Bagrat fought the second Georgian-Byzantine War in 1027–1030 which ended in a peace agreement between the two states. However, the Byzantine Empire often interfered in Georgian affairs, supporting the renegade nobles against Bagrat. In 1032, Amir Jafar of Tbilisi was captured by the powerful Georgian lords Liparit Bagvashi of Kldekari and Ivane Abazas-dze. However, influenced by the nobles who were resentful of Liparit Baghvashi, Bagrat released the Arab ruler, a decision he later came to regret. Liparit Baghvashi was offended by the royal decision and gradually turned against the king.

In 1038, Bagrat and Lord Liparit besieged Tbilisi for two years, but the king later signed a peace agreement with Amir Jafar without consulting Liparit Baghvashi, who now became Bagrat’s sworn enemy. In 1046, the Byzantines allied themselves with Liparit Baghvashi and launched a major campaign to defeat Bagrat and replace him with his half-brother Prince Demetre. In 1046, Liparit Baghvashi routed Bagrat IV’s army, which also included Viking mercenaries, at Sasireti, capturing Tbilisi and forcing Bagrat to retreat into eastern Georgia. The battle undermined the royal authority in Georgia and further accelerated the decentralization process, leaving Georgia vulnerable to the Seljuk attacks. It would take King Bagrat another six years to restore his authority over the eastern and southwestern Georgian provinces.

Forgotten Battle in the Kingdom of Georgia during the Age of the Crusades

We will rather die on the battlefield than run.

Contemplating the Age of Crusades, images of the sacked Jerusalem, exploits of Saladin and Richard the Lion Heart and the great victories at Hattin (see “Jihadi Victories” by Ralph Peters, July 2008 ACG) or Arsuf come to mind at once. The epic struggle between the West and East is well studied and its triumphs and defeats popularized. However, one important actor of this conflict is conspicuously absent in the histories of the Crusades, although the Georgian victory at Didgori in August of 1121 was no less dramatic than those of the Crusaders and had significant consequences for the regional geopolitics, establishing Georgia as the leading Christian power in the region for the next hundred years.

Georgia is located in southern Caucasia between the Black and the Caspian Seas. The country’s geopolitical location proved to be both a great advantage and a disadvantage. Located between Europe and Asia, Georgia served as a transit route for commerce, culture and religions over the last four millennia and was celebrated as the country of the Golden Fleece throughout the ancient world. However, the country also saw its share of conquerors vying for control over these lands. Emerging as a united kingdom in the 10th century, Georgia soon found itself engaged in unequal struggle against the Seljuk Turks, who began massive migration to Asia Minor and the Caucasus. After founding the Seljuk Sultanate in 1055, they expanded their sphere of influence to Iran, Iraq and Syria. In 1064, Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan led a successful incursion into southern regions of Georgia and, four years later, he ravaged eastern Georgia and even reached Imereti in western Georgia. In 1071, the Seljuk victory over the Byzantine army at the crucial battle of Manzikert (see “Jihadi Victories” by Ralph Peters, July 2008 ACG) opened the way for their systematic conquest of the Caucasus. The year 1080 started the period known as the “Great Turkish Onslaught” (didi turkoba) in Georgia, when Turkic tribes arrived in large numbers to settle on Georgian lands and turned the occupied territory into pastures, undermining local agriculture and economy. King Giorgi II (1072-1089) of Georgia was forced to recognize their domination and pay tribute to the Seljuk sultan.

Seljuk dominance continued unchecked for almost a decade; the country had been ravaged by enemy invasions, internal dissent and natural disasters. King Giorgi II failed to rise to the occasion and the country needed a strong and energetic ruler to lead the struggle. In 1089, a bloodless coup d’etat forced King Giorgi II to abdicate in favor of his 16-year-old son David. The new king faced a daunting challenge of defeating a powerful enemy and rebuilding a devastated country. Despite his age, David proved to be a very able statesman and military commander. In 1089-1100, he led small detachments harassing and destroying isolated Seljuk troops and tried to revive devastated regions. In 1092, he took advantage of the death of Malik Shah of the Seljuks to cease the payment of annual tribute and stop the seasonal migration of the Turks into Georgia. Over the next ten years, he gradually liberated most of eastern Georgia.

In 1103, King David convened the Ruis-Urbnisi Church Council that reformed the Georgian Orthodox Church, which had a period of ascendancy in the 11th century and came into possession of vast land holdings, turning into “a state within a state” and clashing with the royal authority. The Ruisi-Urbnisi Church Council limited the Church’s authority, expelled rebellious clergy and expanded the royal administration. The office of the powerful Archbishop of Chqondidi was merged with that of Mtsignobartukhutsesi, chief adviser to the King on all state issues. The new office of Chqondideli-Mtsignobartukhutsesi introduced direct royal authority over the church, supervised a new court system (saajo kari) and directed police apparatus (mstovrebi) that spread royal authority throughout the kingdom. As part of his reform, in 1106, King David also began the construction of the Gelati Monastery and Academy that soon became a major educational and cultural center.

In 1110-1117, David continued his expansion throughout southern Transcaucasia, capturing key fortresses, including Samshvilde, Dzerna, Rustavi, Kaladzori, Lore, and Aragani. Seljuk invasions in 1105, 1110 and 1116 were all crushed. In 1118 – 1120, King David launched a major military reform. The Georgian crown possessed the mona spa royal troops of some 5,000 men, but it was dependent militarily on the troops supplied by feudal lords — who often defied the king. To solve this problem, King David came up with a brilliant solution. He married the daughter of the leader of the powerful Cuman-Qipcaqs residing in the northern Caucasus, and in 1118 he invited the entire Cuman-Qipcaq tribe, which was engaged in a bitter war with rising Russian principalities, to resettle in Georgia.[1] David’s decision had long lasting consequences. Georgia was lacking in manpower as a consequence of the devastation brought by Turkish incursions. The royal authority was beset by troublesome nobility jealous of its privileges and apprehensive of an increasingly strong central government. Thus, Qipcaqs would provide the crown with a force that would be loyal to it alone, free of any connections with other vested interests in Georgia. Certainly, the decision to resettle and use a large foreign army was a daring move, which could have had disastrous effects on Georgia. But the gamble worked.

Between 1118 and 1119, King David moved some 40,000 Qipcaq families (approx. 200,000 men) from the northern Caucasus steppes to Kartli (central Georgia) and, to accelerate their assimilation into the Georgian population, they were dispersed over a number of places while retaining their clan structure. They were outfitted by the crown and granted lands to settle. In turn, they provided one soldier per each Qipcaq family, allowing King David to establish a 40,000-man strong standing army in addition to his royal troops. According to the Georgian chronicle, Kartlis Tskhovreba, King David’s policy was exceptionally successful as Qipcaqs soon converted to Christianity and adopted the Georgian way of life.[2] The new army provided the crown with the necessary force to fight both external threats and internal discontent of powerful lords.

The royal chronicler of King David informs us that the Qipcaqs were immediately put to use as the Georgians “began to raid Persia, Shirwan and Great Armenia” and invariably returned home from these campaigns “laden with booty.”[3] Describing King David’s success, the chronicler continues, “It is said that he resembled a swift, fleet-footed panther, by which the vision of Daniel described Alexander [the Great]. Our Alexander was no less than he, although younger, yet comparable in fortune.” The Georgian king soon asserted his authority over nearly the entire southern Transcaucasia, except for Tbilisi, and important regions of the North Caucasus. He established contact with the Crusaders in the Holy Land and there is evidence the two sides tried to coordinate their actions against the Muslims.

The Muslim powers became increasingly concerned about the rapid rise of this Christian state in the southern Caucasus and considered it a greater threat than the Crusaders in Palestine, whom they contained to the Mediterranean coastline. In 1121, Sultan Mahmud b. Muhammad (1118-1131) declared a holy war on Georgia and rallied a large coalition of Muslim states led by the Artuqid Najm al-din El-ğazi and Toğrul b. Muhammad, the Seljuqid ruler of Arran and Nakhichevan; the coalition was also supported by lesser but important local rulers, including “king of the Arabs” Dubays b. Sadaqa (1108-1135), and Tughan-Arslan, lord of Arzin, Bidlis and Dvin.[4] Najm al-din El-ğazi had just celebrated his great victory over the Crusaders under King Roger of Antioch at Balat in 1119 and enjoyed a reputation as a highly experienced Muslim commander. The size of the Muslim army is still a matter of debate with numbers ranging from a fantastic 800,000 men (“Bella Antiochena”, Galterii Cancelarii), 600,000 Turks (Matthew of Edessa) to 400,000 (Smbat Sparapet’s Chronicle) while the estimates of modern Georgian historians vary between 100,000-250,000 men. Although the larger numbers certainly seem exaggerated, all sources indicate that Muslims made massive preparations, gathered an army that was many times larger than any engaged in the Holy Land and vastly outnumbered the Georgians. In mid-summer 1121, the Muslim troops advanced along various routes, with part of them passing the provinces of Arsan al Rum (Erserum) and al-Ghars (Kars), while Sultan Toğrul moved through Ganja and Tughan-Arslan the Hunchback marched from Dvin.[5] Entering Georgian territory, they proceeded by the Manglisi-Didgori valley towards Tiflis.[6] By August 10, 1121, the enormous Muslim army bivouacked on a vast field near Didgori, about a day’s march (40 kilometers) west of Tbilisi.



The Georgians were well aware of the Muslim preparations and took necessary precautions. King David evacuated the regions along the Muslim invasion route and called up his troops. Georgians mustered some 56,000 men, including five hundred Alans, and two hundred Crusaders who arrived from the Holy Land. On August 11, 1121, King David led his army along the Nichbisi Valley from the ancient capital Mtskheta and divided them into two parts, with a larger group under his personal command and a smaller detachment under his son, Prince Demetre, that was to occupy secretly the nearby heights and strike the enemy flank at a signal. On the royal order, the Nichbisi Valley, behind the Georgian troops, was blockaded with fallen trees, leaving no other choice for the Georgian troops but to fight to the death. According to the French knight and historian Galterii, King David appealed to his warriors just before the battle: “Soldiers of Christ! If we fight with abandon, defending the faith of our Lord, we shall not only overcome the countless servants of Satan, but the Devil himself. I will only advise you one thing that will add to our honor and our profit: raising our hands to Heaven we will all swear to our Lord that in the name of love to Him, we will rather die on the battlefield than run….”

The Georgian battle plan involved a cunning move. In the morning of August 12, some 200 cavalrymen departed the Georgian camp and rode to the enemy side, indicating they wanted to defect. The Muslim commanders, surprisingly, not only allowed them into the camp but also gathered to meet them. At a signal, the Georgians suddenly unsheathed their swords and attacked their new hosts, killing and wounding most of them. Observing confusion in the enemy camp, King David ordered general attack on the enemy positions while his son Prince Demetre charged the enemy flank. With their leadership in disarray, the Muslims in the frontline failed to organize any resistance, while those in the back soon became so disorganized that the entire battle lasted only three hours before the enemy army fled in disorder. According to a Georgian chronicler, King David’s troops pursued them for three days “putting all of them to the sword and leaving them to the carnivorous beasts and birds of the mountains and plains” of the Manglisi Valley. Armenian historian Mateos of Urfa wrote that “terrible and savage slaughter of the enemy troops ensued and the [enemy] corpses filled up the rivers and covered all valleys and cliffs,” and claimed that less than hundred men survived from every thousand. Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Asir lamented that “most of the Muslim host perished on the battlefield.” Muslim commander-in-chief El-ğazi himself was wounded and fled with only twenty men while his son-in-law Dubays b. Sadaqa barely escaped after having his necklace torn from his neck (it was later donated to the Gelati Monastery). Georgians captured the entire enemy camp and the fabulous riches it contained.

The triumphant victory at Didgori captured the imagination of future generations. A contemporary chronicler marveled, “What tongue can relate the wonders which our sustaining Christ gave us on that day? And what are the narrations of Homer and Aristotle to me about the Trojan War and the bravery of Achilles or Josephus’ writings about the valor of the Maccabees or Alexander and Titus at Jerusalem?” The battle entered Georgian national consciences as a “miraculous victory” (dzlevai sakvirveli) and is without doubt one of the apogees of Georgian history. It signaled the emergence of Georgia as a great military power in the late 11-12th centuries and shifted the balance scales in favor of Georgian cultural as well as political supremacy in eastern Asia Minor.

Following his success, King David captured Tbilisi, the last Muslim enclave remaining from the Arab occupation, in 1122 and moved the Georgian capital here. A well-educated man, he preached tolerance and acceptance of other religions. Muslim historian Ibn al-Azraq noted, “[David] granted aman to [Muslim] people and soothed their hearts and left them alone in all goodness. For that year, he abrogated their taxes and services…. He guaranteed to the Muslim everything they wished… He granted to them the call to prayer, the prayers and the reading [of the Quran] in public … he honored the scholars and Sufis by respecting their stature and [granting them] what they do not enjoy even among the Muslims.”[7]

In 1123-1124, Georgian armies were victorious in the neighboring territories of Armenia, Shirwan and the northern Caucasus, greatly expanding Georgia’s sphere of influence. King David’s daughters were married to Shirwan Shah Akhsitan and Prince Alexios, the son of Byzantine Emperor Nikephoros IV. Thus, by the time of King David’s death on January 24, 1125, Georgia became one of the most powerful states in all of Asia Minor. King David’s successful campaigns inspired the Georgian people, gave them confidence in their own strength and hope for a final victory over the enemy. The country enjoyed revival in agriculture and industry and Georgia’s cities flourished. For his contributions, King David was hailed by a grateful nation as aghmashenebeli (reviver, rebuilder) and canonized as a saint. His massive equestrian statue stands today on one of Tbilisi’s hills, still keeping watch over his people.

Alexander Mikaberidze, PhD, is assistant professor of European history at Louisiana State University in Shreveport. He holds a degree in international law from Tbilisi State University (1999) and a PhD in history from Florida State University (2003). He has taught European and Middle Eastern history at Florida State and Mississippi State Universities and lectured on strategy and policy for the U.S. Naval War College. He was the recipient of a Ben Weider Scholarship and has written and edited seven books, including the acclaimed The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon versus Kutuzov (2007), Historical Dictionary of Georgia (2007), and The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815 (2004; winner of the 2005 Literary Prize of the International Napoleonic Society).


Bibliography:

Kartlis Tskhovreba [Life of Kartli], ed. S. Kaukhchishvili (Tbilisi, 1955-1973)

Sh. Meskhia, Didgorskaya bitva [Battle at Didgori] Tbilisi, 1974)

R. Metreveli, Davit Aghmashenebeli [David the Builder] (Tbilisi, 1990)

Iv. Javakhishvili, Kartveli eris istoria [History of the Georgian People] (Tbilisi, 1965), vol. II.

V. Minorsky, “Caucasica in the History of Mayyafariqin,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (13(1949): 27-35.

W. E. Allen, A history of the Georgian people: From the beginning down to the Russian conquest in the nineteenth century, (New York, 1971)

I. Brosset, Histoire de la Géorgie: depuis l’antiquité jusqu’au XIXe siècle (St. Petersburg, 1857), 2 vols.


NOTES:

[1] Kartlis Tskhovreba, IV, 158-159
[2] Kartlis Tskhovreba, I, 335-337
[3] Kartlis Tskhovreba, I, 337-338, 340.
[4] Record of the administration of Najm al-din El-Ghazi in Minorsky, Caucasica in the History of Mayyafariqin, 32.
[5] Ibid., 32.
[6] Brosset, i/1, 366.
[7] Record of the administration of Najm al-din El-Ghazi in Minorsky, Caucasica in the History of Mayyafariqin, 34-35

The last decade of the 20th century proved to be extremely tense for Georgia. Ethnic conflicts and civil wars, combined with severe economic and political crises, had devastated the country, turning it from one of the most prosperous Soviet republic into one of the poorest and underdeveloped states in Europe. Georgia’s political development during these years of turmoil and her struggle to maintain independence vis-à-vis the neo-imperialist aspirations of Russia, are very complicated and difficult to illustrate.

The success of the Georgian national-liberation movement, which culminated in the Georgian declaration of independence in 1991, soon proved to be bittersweet. President Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s anti-Russian and nationalistic policies, and increasingly authoritarian rule led to an acute political conflict in Georgia in 1990-1991. The government adopted the doctrine of “hosts and guests” and threatened national minorities residing in Georgia. Gamsakhurdia himself saw enemies everywhere around him and denounced his political opponents as “agents and stooges of the Kremlin.” The new president’s erratic policies soon led to the resignation of several key government members, including Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua and Foreign Minister Giorgi Khoshtaria.

In the fall of 1991, demonstrations against Gamsakhurdia’s government regularly took place in Tbilisi. Georgian society, including national security forces, became split into two opposing sides. As clashes escalated in Tbilisi, Gamsakhurdia declared a state of emergency and cracked down on the opposition. Some units of the National Guard, led by Tengiz Kitovani, withdrew to the outskirts of the Georgian capital, where they defied orders to disband and began preparations for a military coup. Gamsakhurdia’s former allies joined forces with the opposition, which now included the National Independence Party (Irakli Tserteli), Popular Front (Nodar Natadze), Rustaveli Society (Akaki Bakradze), National Democratic Party (Giorgi Chanturia), etc.

In late December 1991, Kitovani’s forces launched an assault on Tbilisi and were supported by the Mkhedrioni paramilitary units led by Jaba Ioseliani. By 22 December, the rebels besieged the Parliament building, where Gamsakhurdia and his loyal troops put up a fierce resistance. The resulting fighting led to many deaths and destruction of the central district of Tbilisi. On 6 January 1992, Gamsakhurdia finally broke through the blockade and escaped to Armenia and then to Chechnya, where he organized his government in exile. Kitovani and Ioseliani, with support of former Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, established an interim government, the Military Council. To legalize their coup against a democratically elected president, the members of the Military Council invited Eduard Shevardnadze, whose international clout was imperative to decriminalize the new authorities. In March 1992, Shevardnadze became the head of the State Council.

Meanwhile, the situation in Georgia escalated and led to ethno-territorial conflicts that plunged the country in the abyss of civil war and economic collapse. In February 1992, fighting intensified in South Ossetia, where Russia provided covert support for separatists. Shevardnadze was forced to make concessions and signed an armistice in July 1992 that established the Joint Control Commission to regulate the conflict. Fighting in Ossetia was barely over when tensions in secessionist Abkhazia, also supported by Russia, led to violence in August 1992. Georgian authorities dispatched the National Guard and paramilitary units and the sporadic clashes soon escalated into a major war between the Russian-backed separatists and Georgian forces. Within a year, Georgian troops were routed and some 300,000 Georgian and other residents of Abkhazia expelled in a widespread ethnic cleansing of the region.

The entanglement of official Tbilisi in Abkhazia encouraged Zviad Gamsakhurdia to return to Georgia, where he rallied forces in his native region of Mingrelia (Samegrelo) and in Tbilisi. In June 1992, Zviadists seized the state television center in Tbilisi, but were driven out by the National Guard. In 1993, the pro-Gamsakhurdia forces under Colonel Loti Kobalia launched a surprise attack against the government troops in Mingrelia and occupied strategic positions in the regions. Their actions played a crucial role in the failure of Georgian forces in Abkhazia since reinforcements were delayed or diverted to fight the insurgency. Threatened on both fronts, Shevardnadze was forced to make concessions to Russia and join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in return for Russian military support against the rebels. In October 1993, Georgian government forces, supported by the Russian troops, launched a counterattack against Gamsakhurdia’s forces; the Russian navy landed troops to secure the strategic port of Poti. Heavy fighting took place around Samtredia, Khobi, Senaki and Zugdidi; the combat was particularly savage in Mingrelia (Samegrelo) proper, where the Mkhedrioni paramilitary units went on a rampage. These atrocities contributed to the eventual antagonism of Mingrelians towards Shevardnadze and his government. By December 1993, most of Mingrelia was under government control and the pro-Gamsakhurdia leaders imprisoned; Gamsakhurdia himself was found dead under suspicious circumstances (the official version supports a suicide) near the village of Jikhashkari.

The civil war remains one of the most dramatic and decisive events in history of modern Georgia. A prosperous Soviet republic, Georgia was completely devastated during the three years of conflict, with the economy and industry shattered and the population suffering from gas and electric outages. The collapse of the central authorities led to the rise of numerous criminal gangs while the activities of Mkhedrioni paramilitary units affected thousands of citizens throughout the country. The civil war certainly contributed to the separatist movements in Ossetia and Abkhazia by radicalizing the sides involved in this conflicts and diverting much-needed Georgian resources. Other regions, notably Adjara and Javakheti, became increasingly defiant of the central authorities. Furthermore, Georgian society itself became split into two irreconcilable sides that became engaged in a vicious struggle for the next decade.

As the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia subsided in 1994, Shevardnadze turned to domestic affairs and sought to restore the central authority that was gravely weakened during the turmoil. Over the next three years, he outmaneuvered his political opponents and consolidated his authority. The once powerful warlords Jaba Ioseliani and Kitovani were imprisoned and paramilitary units banned. In August 1995, a new Constitution was adopted establishing the institute of the Presidency and the Parliament. In 1995, and later in 2000, Shevardnadze was elected President of Georgia, though elections were marred by claims of widespread fraud and vote rigging. In August 1995, Shevardnadze barely survived an assassination attempt during the official signing ceremony of the Constitution on 29 August and used this event to get rid of his opposition. In early February 1998 Shevardnadze survived another attempt on his life and investigations alleged Zviadist involvement, leading to increased persecutions of Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. In October 1998, a two-day armed insurrection by pro-Gamsakhurdia troops threatened to destabilize Georgia but ended after the mutineers surrendered to government forces.

Shevardnadze’s presidency constitutes an important period in the recent history of Georgia. On his arrival, the country was ravaged by a civil war and ethnic conflicts, the economic and industrial infrastructure was largely destroyed. Georgian society itself was demoralized, divided into factions and dominated by warlords. Using his former contacts in the diplomatic world, Shevardnadze established close relations with the United States, which he perceived as a counterbalance to the Russian influence in Transcaucasia. Georgia soon became a major recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid, signed a strategic partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and even declared its goal of joining NATO and the European Union (EU). One of Shevardnadze’s major achievements was showing to Western and American policymakers that Georgia can serve as a secure East-West energy corridor, which allowed Tbilisi to secure a multi-billion oil pipeline project (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) to transport oil from the Caspian Sea to the European markets. In 1999, Georgia celebrated another important success as it joined the Council of Europe and, in 2000, Tbilisi became the 137th member of the World Trade Organization. In 2002, Georgia announced its resolve to seek full membership in the Euro-Atlantic alliance, becoming a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.

However, Shevardnadze’s relative successes in foreign affairs were more than outweighed by domestic failures. While economic reforms were launched, they were not far-reaching enough and were often erratically enforced. The shadow economy accounted for as much as 60 percent of the country’s economic product as tax evasion, smuggling, extortion, bribery and rigged privatization became pervasive. Shevardnadze was unable to restore central authority in some regions, especially in Adjara. Supporters of Gamsakhurdia and other dissidents were persecuted and many imprisoned on trumped-up charges. Corruption became so rampant that Georgia became known as one of the world's most corrupt countries. Shevardnadze's closest advisers and associates, including members of his family, exerted disproportionate economic power and controlled large portions of the oil trade and media holdings. In 2001, Shevardnadze began an extensive anti-corruption reform but it proved to be an empty gesture. In October 2001, public discontent led to protests in Tbilisi, after Rustavi 2, an independent television station that had been critical of the government, was raided by security officials. Public demonstrations forced Shevardnadze to announce the dismissal of his entire government in November. In April 2002, economic woes were worsened by a natural disaster as a powerful earthquake rocked Tbilisi, causing extensive damage to some 2,500 buildings.

Irritated by Georgia’s pro-Western course, Russia actively encouraged separatism in Abkhazia and Ossetia while effectively declaring an economic blockade that resulted in widespread power and gas cuts in Georgia. The escalating war in Chechnya further deteriorated Russo-Georgian relations as Russia accused Shevardnadze of harboring Chechen guerrillas. After the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Georgia became a strategic partner in the American war against international terrorism. Tbilisi offered Georgian airspace and airfields to America during the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and contributed troops to the international contingent in Iraq. In 2002, Shevardnadze turned to the U.S. for assistance to enhance Georgia’s military preparedness and a special Train and Equip Program to train the Georgian army was launched with the financial backing from Washington.

The charges of dishonesty and fraud left Shevardnadze’s vulnerable during the Parliamentary elections of 2003. The officially announced results of this election favored Shevardnadze’s ruling party but were immediately denounced as rigged and unfair by the opposition and international election observers. This caused massive demonstrations, popularly known as the Rose Revolution, demanding the resignation of the president. Led by Shevardnadze’s one-time protégés, Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burdjanadze and Mikhail Saakashvili, the protesters broke into Parliament on 21 November 2003, forcing Shevardnadze to escape with his bodyguards. Pressured by foreign powers, Shevardnadze announced his resignation on 23 November and was replaced as president on an interim basis by Burdjanadze.

Thus, a powerful coalition of reformists headed by Saakashvili, Burdjanadze and Zhvania found itself at the helm of the state. In January 2004, Saakashvili won a landslide victory in the presidential elections. He pushed through constitutional amendments that strengthened the powers of the president and restored the post of prime minister for his ally Zurab Zhvania. Saakashvili’s first great success came in removing Aslan Abashidze, the defiant leader of Adjara, and bringing this region back under control of the central authorities. He sought to reconcile Georgian society by rehabilitating former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and releasing Gamsakhurdia’s supporters who were imprisoned by the Shevardnadze government. Saakashvili also pushed through the change of state symbols and adopted new national flag and coat of arms in 2004; furthermore, in a bid to portray Georgia as a European state, the new administration had ordered the flag of European Union to be flown together with the state flag at government buildings.

Economic reforms and improvements in living standards are of great priority since almost half of the population of Georgia lives below the poverty line. The low rate of economic growth places Georgia as 100th out of the 177 countries listed in the United Nation Development Program's Human Development Report of 2005, significantly lower than most of the transitional countries. A growing gap between the rich and poor is also of great concern. Saakashvili’s government directed its efforts to fighting the widespread black economy, reforming tax codes, imposing more rigorous tax-collection and making the country more attractive for foreign investment. Georgia’s economic reforms and new round of privatization earned praise from the international community and helped secure new credit lines from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The military forces were substantially modernized and increased. More far-reaching, and dramatic, was the new government’s anti-corruption campaign that purged the government bureaucracy of thousands of officials. The family and clan structure of Georgian society continued to facilitate a system in which corruption could easily flourish. Thus, the watchdog Transparency International ranked Georgia on the 124th place (out of 133) in 2003 and on the 133rd place (out of 145) in 2004. It remains to be seen if the new government will be able to eradicate corruption – which is so widespread and deeply rooted in Georgian society – in the short term.

Another priority spelled out by Saakashvili after his election is bringing back the breakaway regions under Georgian authority. After restoring control of Adjara, the new presidency shifted its attention towards the separatist region of South Ossetia, which led to sharp tensions and brief clashes between the two sides. In 2006-2007, Tbilisi supported the establishment of the pro-Georgian forces in South Ossetia, where an alternative government (led by Dmitri Sanakoyev) was formed to counter-balance the separatist authorities. In May-June 2007, the Georgian government made a major push to have international community recognize Sanakoyev's government, a first step in the potential conflict resolution. In late June 2007, Sanakoyev made an unprecedented three-day visit to Brussels as part of Tbilisi’s campaign to align conflict resolution in Georgia with European, rather than Russian, interests.

In Abkhazia, after years of status-quo, political situation has slightly changed in the fall of 2006, when the Georgian authorities carried out a security operation against a rebel warlord in the Upper Abkhazia and, after securing the region, moved the seat of the Abkhazian government-in-exile there. This decision caused an outcry on the part of the Abkhaz separatists, as well as in Russia, who denounced Tbilisi's actions as a first step towards forceful resolution of the conflict. Since then, the Abkhaz authorities refuse to participate in diplomatic negotiations until Tbilisi agrees to remove the Abkhazian government-in-exile from the upper Abkhazia.

The issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are very sensitive indeed and cannot be seen separately from the relations with Russia, which exerts great influence in the separatist regions; as former Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze once commented, "the keys to the conflict resolution in these regions lay in the Russian hands." Yet, Relations with Russia remain of major concern in light of Russia's continuing political, economic and military support of separatist authorities in both regions. The new government of Georgia pursues a strongly pro-Western, particularly pro-US, foreign policy and seeks Georgian membership in the NATO and the EU. After the start of the American war in Iraq, Georgia joined the coalition forces and remains one of the major contributors to the coalition in terms of a country's per capita troop deployment. In 2004, the North Atlantic Council of the NATO approved the Individual Partnership Action Plan of Georgia (IPAP). In May 2005, Georgia was visited by the U.S. President George W. Bush and greeted by tens of thousands of Georgians at the Freedom Square in Tbilisi. With the US backing, Georgia achieved a historic agreement with Russia on the complete withdrawal of Russian military bases by 2008. Such pro-Western overtures only embitter Georgia’s northern neighbor, which still perceives south Caucasia as its sphere of influence and vital to its geo-strategic interests.

In 2006, the Russo-Georgian relations hit a new low. In the spring, in the so-called “wine war,” Russia banned the imports of Georgian wine. The official explanation that the ban was motivated by health concerns was hardly convincing since Georgia had long been supplying the Russian market and sudden detection by the Russians of health hazards in Georgian wine naturally raised eyebrows. Furthermore, the ban was not followed by an order to remove Georgian wine already in Russia, which would have been a logical move to protect the Russian consumers from a detected health concern. Ironically, even after the ban, Georgian wine products continued to appear suggesting that a significant portion of the Georgian wine was produced/falsified inside Russia. Still, Russia's decision to close its market had a serious effect on the Georgian winemakers, who scrambled to seek new markets for their products. Despite initial difficulties, the Russian ban may end up benefiting the Georgian wine business since it was compelled to diversify its markets and introduce Georgian wine to new regions.

The Russo-Georgian squabbles were not limited to the "wine war" alone but the intrastate relations further deteriorated in September/October 2006 when the Georgian government arrested four Russian military officers on charges of espionage; seeking arrest of one more Russian officer, the Georgian authorities surrounded the headquarters of the Russian forces in Transcaucasia located in Tbilisi. This event brought the Russo-Georgian relations to the lowest point in over a decade. In response to Tbilisi's actions, Russia summoned its ambassador to Georgia and withdrew almost all of its embassy’s staff, and imposed a series of punitive measures on Georgia, suspending all land, see, and air transportation between Georgia and Russia, banning Georgian exports to Russia, and locating, rounding up, and deporting many legal and illegal Georgian migrants from Russia. Such persecutions led to international outcry condemning Russian authorities for their xenophobic actions.

Relations between Tbilisi and Moscow remain tense, although in June 2007, Presidents Saakashvili and Putin agreed to normalize relations and Russia pledged to lift its sanctions. Yet, another incident in early August revealed the ongoing deep conflict between Russia and Georgia. According to the findings of two international groups of experts, on 6 August, an unidentified aircraft intruded into Georgia’s airspace from Russia, fired anti-radar missile at the Georgian military radar installation and flew back to the Russian Federation. Russia vehemently denied its role in this incident and suggested the it was staged by the Georgian authorities for propaganda purposes. The incident further highlighted the gap between Russia and the US, when the official Washington sided with Tbilisi and denounced Russian actions.


Historical Dictionary of Georgia
by Alexander Mikaberidze (Author)
Series: Historical Dictionaries of Europe (Book 50)
Hardcover: 784 pages
Publisher: Scarecrow Press (March 16, 2007)
Language: English
ISBN-13: 978-0810855809
ISBN-10: 0810855801